1 Aristotle, Physics, trans. Philip H. Wicksteed and Francis M. Cornford (Cambridge, 1929, rev. and rpt. 1967) iv, ch. 11, 218b (p. 383 When we have been asleep, we are prepared to allow that a good deal of time has elapsed since a given event occurred even though we were not ourselves aware of any change during the interval, for in such cases it is plausible to hold that our belief that an interval of a certain duration has elapsed is founded on the inductively grounded belief that changes did occur that we could have been aware of had we been awake and suitably situated.4
There are, as Shoemaker implies here, logically conceivable circumstances "in which the existence of changeless intervals could be detected."5 passed, any more than it did to the men in the fable who 'slept with the heroes' in Sardinia, when they awoke; for under such circumstances we fit the former 'now' on to the later, making them one and the same and eliminating the interval between them, because we did not perceive it." On Aristotle's understanding of change, see Physics, v. 3 Aristotle's understanding of a "now of indeterminate duration" provides the context for Shoemaker's argument that there can be no-time, which is not the same as "no time" in Aristotle's sense. See Aristotle's rhetorical question in Physics iv, chap. 10, 217b-218a (p. 373): "Some of it is past and no longer exists, and the rest is future and does not yet exist; and time, whether limitless or any given length of time we take, is entirely made up of the no-longer and not-yet; and how can we conceive of that which is composed of non-existents sharing in existence in any way?" Aristotle's question implies that a "now" without a discernable past or future means that time, as a measure of change, does not exist: without boundaries, there is, in Aristotle's sense, no change. But Aristotle's argument here, implied by his rhetorical question, is an argument that for Aristotle isn't true. The argument is meant to catch those who, for Aristotle, reason incorrectly. A "now of indeterminate duration" has a past that, yes, "no longer exists," but that had to exist, and a future that does not "yet exist," but will exist. There always is, for Aristotle, a past and a future, hence a present, hence change, hence time, the measure of change. See also iv, chap. 10, 218b (pp. 375, 377): "Again, if simultaneity in time, and not being before or after, means coinciding and being in the very 'now' wherein they coincide, then, if the before and the after were both in the persistently identical 'now' we are discussing, what happened ten thousand years ago would be simultaneous with what is happening to-day, and nothing would be before or after anything else." For Shoemaker's argument that there are ways to perceive what occurs or has occurred in this one continuous "now," see "Time without Change," in The Philosophy of Time, Oxford Readings in Philosophy, eds. Robin Le Poidevin and Murray MacBeath, (Oxford, 1993 , rpt. 2009 .
